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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
Stanley Cottman pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to 
possess, sell, and dispose of stolen property in violation of 
18 U.S.C. S 371. He was sentenced to 10 months in prison, 
a three year term of supervised release, and restitution in 
the amount of $32,420, payable to the FBI. He has 
appealed two aspects of the sentence imposed by the 
district court. First, he claims that the district court 
incorrectly applied a four point upward adjustment under 
Sentencing Guideline S 2B1.1(b)(4)(B) on the basis that he 
was "in the business of " receiving and selling stolen cable 
equipment. Second, he contends that the district court had 
no authority to order him to pay restitution to the FBI for 
funds it spent as part of an undercover sting operation to 
acquire the stolen cable equipment from him. Wefind no 
error in the sentence enhancement under S 2B1.1(b)(4)(B) 
and we will affirm that portion of the sentence. However, 
because we conclude that the FBI was not a victim of 
Cottman's offense, we will vacate that portion of the 
judgment of sentence, imposing restitution, and we will 
remand this case for resentencing. 
 
I. Factual Background and Procedural History  
 
Pursuant to an ongoing investigation of cable television 
piracy, the FBI established an undercover warehouse 
operation in Kenilworth, New Jersey. Agents equipped the 
premises with video and audio recording devices. An 
undercover FBI agent (the UCA) was the principal operator 
of the warehouse. Transcripts and videotapes of 
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conversations, as well as other evidence developed as part 
of the sting, revealed the following events:2 
 
On February 7, 1995, the UCA in a consensually 
monitored telephone conversation, spoke to a person 
known to the UCA as Frank Russo. Russo advised the UCA 
that an individual known as George "the Animal" Kanter 
expected to obtain approximately 80 General Instrument 
Corporation (GI) cable boxes within a week. Russo inquired 
whether the UCA would act as a "middle man" and receive 
the boxes on his behalf. The terms of the transaction called 
for a total cost of $150 per unit, which broke down into 
$130 for the merchandise, $10 for Kanter's commission, 
and $10 for the UCA. Russo further explained that, as this 
was a "green deal," cash up front would be required. Russo 
asked the UCA to front the cash for him because he would 
be detained in Florida and unable to bring the money up 
personally. When the UCA agreed to broker the deal, Russo 
stated that he would have Kanter contact the UCA 
immediately. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Pre-Sentence Report (PSI) also discussed statements provided by 
an anonymous source who advised the FBI in December 1994 about 
many of Cottman's alleged activities. The Source made an 
uncorroborated statement that sometime in 1994 or 1995 Cottman had 
been involved in an armed robbery of a cable store in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, with another individual known only to the Source as "Al." 
Al received approximately 70% of the proceeds from selling the units 
obtained in the heist and $5,000 for his role in the robbery, while 
Cottman received $14,000. See PSI at P 12. 
 
The Source also disclosed details about Cottman's trade in cable 
boxes. According to the Source, Cottman had suppliers from Baltimore 
to New York who fed him cable boxes, chips, and cellular phones. The 
Source indicated that Cottman sold an average of 300 to 400 stolen 
General Instrument cable boxes per month. The Source also stated that 
Cottman had branched out into reselling stolen vehicles. PSI P 13. 
 
Finally, the source identified a number of Cottman's alleged sources. 
These included individuals identified as Walay, Leo "the Chinaman" from 
New York, Roger, Frank, and Kevin. The Source stated that Kevin was a 
resident of Philadelphia and heavily involved in stolen credit cards and 
cable boxes. The source credited Kevin with providing Cottman with 
approximately 100 cable boxes per month. PSI P 14. 
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Within minutes the UCA heard from Kanter. Kanter 
stated that he had 65 units and that "his guy," was going 
to get more. Kanter said he would be in touch again when 
they were ready to do the deal. 
 
The following day, February 8, 1995, Kanter again 
contacted the UCA. Kanter stated that "his guy" should be 
back that day, that he would have the total number of 
units by that night, and that a meeting would be arranged 
shortly. 
 
On February 10, Kanter and "his guy" Stanley Cottman 
delivered about 70 boxes containing 65 GI baseband units, 
many of which appeared to be in brand new unopened 
shipping cartons. The UCA paid $8,650 in cash to Cottman 
and $650 to Kanter. During the meeting, Cottman removed 
all of the serial numbers from the cartons and instructed 
the UCA to remove all the stickers from the original boxes. 
Cottman also took the opportunity to elaborate on his 
involvement in the illegal cable box trade. Cottman boasted 
that "[A]t one point I get 3 hundred . . . . See, I deal with 
the same ole people over and over and over, the same ole 
people, no problems. . . . It's slow now since the people we 
deal with is so good, they get stuff even if it's slow . . . ." 
 
Later investigation revealed that at least 52 of the 65 GI 
units were brand new. Approximately 9 of the units had 
been shipped in late December 1994 to TCI Cablevision in 
Baltimore, Maryland, while the remaining units had been 
shipped to Comcast Corporation in Philadelphia just eleven 
days before the sale. 
 
Cottman, without Kanter, returned to the UCA's 
warehouse on February 19, 1995, to consummate another 
deal. Cottman explained that he had left Kanter out of this 
transaction because he was unsure of his ability to obtain 
the boxes. Cottman produced 75 GI baseband cable boxes 
for which the UCA paid him $10,500. 
 
The UCA engaged Cottman in further discussion about 
his involvement in illegal cable box trafficking. At one point 
Cottman said to Kanter: "It started out with one and two to 
where me and him was moving thousands . . . a week. So 
I had met a lucky connection up here." Cottman also 
repeated his assertion that, although he usually got 100 or 
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200 units per week, at one time he was pulling in about 
300 cable boxes a week from his sources. With further 
inquiries from the UCA, Cottman explained that the people 
he worked with at the cable companies would pilfer the 
cable boxes by simply erasing them from the inventory lists 
on the companies' computers. 
 
Later investigation again revealed that 64 of the 70 
baseband units Cottman sold to the UCA were new. All 64 
had been shipped to TCI in Baltimore on February 7 and 8, 
1995, and received on February 13 and 14. Of these, 62 
had been in the possession of Excalibur Cable 
Communications, Ltd., of Baltimore and had allegedly been 
stolen in a strong arm robbery of one of its employees, 
Steven Holder, on the evening of February 17, 1995, just 
two days before Cottman sold them to the UCA. 
 
Cottman later denied any involvement with the robbery 
or knowledge of how he came to acquire the Excalibur 
Cable boxes, insisting that all the cable boxes had been 
provided by an Englishman named "Roger." However, 
telephone records indicated that calls were made from 
Cottman's residence to Holder on February 9, 19, and 26, 
1995. Furthermore, Cottman's "800" number telephone 
records showed that he was called by Holder's supervisor, 
Dwight Chew, on January 15, 1995. 
 
Finally, on February 21, 1995, Cottman and Kanter 
together came to the warehouse to deliver about 86 GI 
baseband cable boxes in exchange for $13,280 paid to 
Cottman and $1650 paid to Kanter. Cottman again 
physically removed the serial numbers from the outside 
packing cartons and instructed the UCA that the serial 
numbers needed to be stripped from the individual boxes. 
Later investigation revealed that 40 of these units had been 
shipped to Comcast of Philadelphia and TCI of Baltimore in 
February 1995. 
 
In these three transactions, Cottman sold a total of 231 
cable boxes for $34,730.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The restitution of $32,420, which the district court ordered Cottman 
to pay, has had the amount paid to Kanter, $2,310, deducted from the 
total payments of $34,730. 
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Cottman was indicted on one count of conspiring to 
possess and sell stolen cable equipment, valued in excess 
of $5,000, that had crossed state lines in violation of 18 
U.S.C. S 371, and three substantive counts charging him 
with the receipt and sale of stolen cable equipment, valued 
in excess of $5,000, that had crossed state lines in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. SS 2 and 2315. Federal authorities arrested 
Cottman on March 7, 1995, at his residence in Perth 
Amboy, New Jersey. 
 
Cottman made a voluntary statement to the FBI following 
his arrest in which he stated that he had been employed 
with RTK Cable Company and had run a sideline business 
called Incognito Sound Labs, Inc., which he operated out of 
a public storage facility. According to Cottman, the 
principal focus of his business was the installation of car 
radios, for which he would charge $500. Cottman also 
admitted that he had in the past worked for various cable 
companies in order to make contacts who would later 
provide him with cable boxes. 
 
After negotiations, a written plea agreement was reached. 
Pursuant to the agreement, Cottman entered a guilty plea 
to the conspiracy count on March 7, 1996. The district 
court then dismissed the three substantive counts of the 
indictment. 
 
On July 22, 1996, Cottman was sentenced by the district 
court to a 10-month prison term to be followed by 3 years 
of supervised release. As a special condition of supervised 
release, the court ordered Cottman to pay as restitution the 
$32,420 expended by the FBI to acquire the stolen cable 
boxes from him. The district court denied Cottman's 
request for bail pending appeal.4 
 
Cottman immediately filed his notice of appeal. The 
notice was dated July 22, 1996, but was not filed by the 
clerk until July 25, 1996. One day later the district court 
entered its final judgment and order of commitment.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. This Court denied a similar motion by Cottman on August 29, 1996. 
 
5. While at one time this sequence of events might have been fatal to 
Cottman's appeal, see United States v. Matthews, 462 F.2d 182, 183-84 
(3d Cir. 1972), the rule is now firmly established in this Circuit that a 
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II. Sentencing Issues 
 
A. Mootness 
 
As a preliminary matter, we must consider the fact that 
Cottman has completed his ten month term of 
incarceration, leaving only his three years of supervised 
release to be served.6 We must determine whether the 
completion of his term of imprisonment has mooted 
Cottman's challenge to the district court's application of the 
"in the business" enhancement. 
 
Although the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have 
determined that challenges of the length of defendants' 
sentences are no longer viable after the defendant has been 
released from custody, see, e.g., United States v. Ross, 77 
F.3d 1525, 1549 n.6 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Farmer, 923 F.2d 1557, 1568 (11th Cir. 1991), we do not 
agree. We conclude that a finding of mootness is forestalled 
here because Cottman may still suffer " `collateral legal 
consequences' from a sentence already served." 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108 n.3 (1977) (per 
curiam). 
 
Two considerations, both of which are products of 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, lead us to this 
determination. First, the S 2B1.1(b)(4)(B) "in the business" 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
premature notice of appeal in a criminal case can ripen into valid notice 
of appeal when the district court enters the judgment of sentence. See 
United States v. Hashagen, 816 F.2d 899, 900-06 (3d Cir. 1987) (in 
banc). The revised rule comes with the proviso that a premature notice 
is prejudicial and will not preserve the appeal if it "is filed so early 
that 
it does not properly apprise the opposing party of its intention to appeal 
the final judgment." Id. at 903. 
 
We have no need to invoke the proviso here. Cottman's notice, while 
premature, was filed just one day before the entry of the judgment of 
sentence. The district court docket reveals no events intervening between 
Cottman's notice and the entry of final judgment. Indeed, this Court has 
considered this exact situation previously and found the notice of appeal 
adequate to confer appellate jurisdiction. See United States v. Console, 
13 F.3d 641, 649 n.3 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
6. Cottman's attorney informed us of this fact at oral argument. 
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sentencing enhancement increases Cottman's Criminal 
History Category from I to II for any future convictions. See, 
e.g., United States v. Kassar, 47 F.3d 562, 565 (2d Cir. 
1995); United States v. Chaves-Palacios, 30 F.3d 1290, 
1292-93 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Dickey, 924 F.2d 
836, 838 (9th Cir. 1991). The district court's application of 
the enhancement increased Cottman's total offense level 
from ten to twelve, pushing him from Zone B to Zone C on 
the Sentencing Table which determines his guideline range. 
See U.S.S.G. S 5A (1995). Because his sentence placed him 
in Zone C, Cottman no longer qualified for a sentence of 
probation in lieu of imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. SS 5B1.1 & 
5C1.1 (1995). Cottman, as a result, acquired two, rather 
than one, criminal history points. The net outcome is that 
a sentence for any future conviction which may be imposed 
upon Cottman under the Guidelines will be significantly 
increased. 
 
Second, if we were to find an error in the application of 
the "in the business" enhancement, the appropriate 
sentencing range would be reduced from 10-16 months to 
6-12 months. See U.S.S.G. S 5A. This reduction would 
likely merit a credit against Cottman's period of supervised 
release for the excess period of imprisonment to which 
Cottman was subjected. See United States v. Fadayini, 28 
F.3d 1236, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 
For these reasons, we do not consider Cottman's appeal 
to be moot even though he has served the imprisonment 
portion of his sentence. 
 
B. Application of the "In the Business" Enhancement 
 
The first of Cottman's challenges to his sentence is to the 
district court's application of the four level sentencing 
enhancement for persons in the business of receiving and 
selling stolen property. See U.S.S.G. S 2B1.1(b)(4).7 This 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Section 2B1.1(4) provides: 
 
       (A) If the offense involved more than minimal planning increase by 
       2 levels; or 
 
       (B) If the offense involved receiving stolen property, and the 
       defendant was a person in the business of receiving and selling 
       stolen property, increase by 4 levels. 
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enhancement is seen as a more severe punishment for 
"people who buy and sell stolen goods, thereby encouraging 
others to steal, as opposed to thieves who merely sell the 
goods which they have stolen." United States v. Sutton, 77 
F.3d 91, 93 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 
At sentencing, the district court in its bench ruling 
extensively discussed United States v. King, 21 F.3d 1302 
(3d Cir. 1994), the lone decision of this Circuit interpreting 
the "in the business" enhancement of U.S.S.G. S 2B1.1. In 
addition, the court thoroughly reviewed the evidence 
adduced by the parties. The district court found that 
"Cottman had a steady source of stolen cable boxes that 
was generated from more than one robbery or theft" and 
concluded that the operation in which Cottman participated 
was a sophisticated one given that "his source of cable 
boxes appear [sic] to have been persons employed by cable 
companies who obtained the boxes in part by deleting the 
boxes from the companies' inventories to conceal their 
theft." Based on these findings the court found that 
Cottman was "clearly an integral part of this operation" and 
deserved the sentencing enhancement even if he was not 
the "criminal mastermind" behind it. 
 
In King, we briefly reviewed the approaches taken by 
other circuits that have considered a defendant's eligibility 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
U.S.S.G. S 2B1.1 (Nov. 1, 1995). 
 
This enhancement has a much traveled history in the Guidelines. It 
first appeared with the initial promulgation of the Guidelines in 1987 at 
S 2B1.2(b)(2)(A). As of January 1988, this language was relocated within 
the same section at S 2B1.2(b)(3)(A), where it remained until November 1, 
1990. See U.S.S.G. App. C., amend. 8. As of that date it was again 
moved within the same section to S 2B1.2(b)(4)(A). See U.S.S.G. App. C., 
amend. 312. Finally, as of November 1, 1993, U.S.S.G. S 2B1.2 was 
deleted and consolidated with U.S.S.G. S 2B1.1. From that point until 
the present this provision has remained in that location. See U.S.S.G. 
App. C., amend 481. 
 
As originally promulgated, the section spoke only of "selling stolen 
property." The Commission amended it in November 1989 to add the 
words "receiving of " immediately before this language. See U.S.S.G. App. 
C., amend. 102 (Nov. 1, 1989). 
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for the four point "in the business" enhancement. King, 21 
F.3d at 1306. We turned to the First Circuit's decision in 
United States v. St. Cyr, 977 F.2d 698 (1st Cir. 1992), 
which set out the "totality of the circumstances" test. King, 
21 F.3d at 1306. The St. Cyr court's approach placed 
"particular emphasis on the regularity and sophistication of 
a defendant's operation." St. Cyr, 977 F.2d at 703. We 
explained that "regularity of conduct is one universal 
thread in virtually all legal definitions of business." King, 21 
F.3d at 1307 (quoting St. Cyr, 977 F.2d at 703-04). We 
further elaborated that where the government offers proof 
only of a defendant's irregular and occasional sales, it must 
also provide "evidence upon which to base a conclusion 
that . . . irregular and occasional sales underrepresented 
the scope of his criminality or the extent to which he 
encouraged or facilitated other crimes." Id. at 1308. 
 
Cottman, however, argues that the enhancement was 
improperly applied to him. Indeed, the Probation Office did 
not include the "in the business" enhancement in 
computing Cottman's Guidelines offense level.8 Cottman 
first maintains that he was nothing more than a "low level 
delivery boy." Cottman claims that he merely obtained the 
cable boxes for resale from an Englishman named "Roger" 
and that the sentencing enhancement is inapplicable 
because Cottman was merely a middleman to Roger, the 
true fence. To support this contention, Cottman asks 
rhetorically why, if he was the "mastermind" of the scheme, 
did he only remove the serial numbers from the outside of 
the cartons, leaving the serial numbers actually attached to 
the cable boxes for later removal. 
 
Cottman's implicit assumption that the "in the business" 
enhancement requires proof that he was the leader, 
organizer, or driving force behind the operation is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The Pre-Sentence Investigative Report prepared by the Probation Office 
imposed only the two point sentencing enhancement for the commission 
of an offense involving more than minimal planning. See PSI P 34 (citing 
U.S.S.G. S 2B1.1(b)(4)(a)). The Probation Office, over the Government's 
objection, declined to apply the four point enhancement of U.S.S.G. 
S 2B1.1(b)(4)(B), citing a lack of evidence that Cottman had committed 
other acts of buying or selling stolen property. See Addendum to PSI, at 
18-19. 
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misguided. Nothing in language, commentary, or 
amendment history of U.S.S.G. S 2B1.1(b)(4)(B) suggests 
that to earn the enhancement the defendant must be the 
criminal "mastermind" behind the scheme. Nor does 
Cottman produce any case law to this effect. Indeed, the 
Sentencing Guidelines already provide for a two point 
enhancement "[i]f the defendant was an organizer, leader, 
manager, or supervisor of any criminal activity." U.S.S.G. 
S 3B1.1(c) (Nov. 1, 1995). Thus, even if Cottman were 
merely a "delivery boy" for the "true fence," his involvement 
could be sufficient to warrant the enhancement. 
 
Second, Cottman asserts that the three transactions in 
which he participated do not establish a pattern of 
trafficking in stolen goods with sufficient regularity to 
support the enhancement. According to Cottman, the 
record does not support the conclusion that he trafficked in 
stolen cable boxes on occasions other than those for which 
he was convicted. He dismisses his statement that he 
regularly received up to 300 cable boxes per week as mere 
puffery designed to impress his fellow conspirators. 
Cottman's position is, however, belied by the facts adduced 
at sentencing. Cottman's boasting about his history of 
trafficking in illegal cable boxes, captured as it was on 
video and audio tape, is a sufficient foundation from which 
the district court could have concluded that he had 
previously engaged in fencing activities. See, e.g., United 
States v. Rosa, 17 F.3d 1531, 1551 (2d Cir. 1994), 
(approving of application of enhancement where inter alia, 
defendant "made clear that these were not hisfirst 
transactions"); United States v. Russell, 913 F.2d 1288, 
1294 (8th Cir. 1990) (same, where, inter alia, defendant 
made "statement to an informant that he could supply 
stolen checks, jewelry, and credit cards"). 
 
Implicit in this argument is Cottman's belief that the 
sentencing enhancement cannot stand without proof that 
he participated in transactions other than the three which 
underlie his conviction. However, even if we were to assume 
that the district court had before it proof only of the three 
transactions of the conspiracy conviction, we would still 
uphold the district court's application of the "in the 
business" enhancement. Contrary to Cottman's suggestion, 
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it is not the law in this Circuit that the enhancement 
cannot lie absent proof that the defendant has previously 
engaged in "fencing" activities. 
 
Our decision in King is not to the contrary.9 There we 
merely distinguished a Fifth Circuit decision which made 
the broad statement that an "in the business enhancement" 
does not require a finding that a defendant has previously 
engaged in the fencing of stolen property. See King, 21 F.3d 
at 1306-07 (citing United States v. Esquivel, 919 F.2d 957, 
960 (5th Cir. 1990)). We did not, however, hold that a 
defendant must in all cases have been involved in previous 
illicit transactions to warrant the enhancement. 
 
Other Circuits have held that the enhancement remains 
appropriate without proof of past sales of stolen property. 
See, e.g., United States v. Sutton, 77 F.3d 91,93-94 (5th Cir. 
1996) (holding that "a criminal can be `in the business' of 
fencing even though this is his first time to fence); United 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We had no occasion in King to consider the merits of the "fence" test 
developed by the Seventh Circuit and since adopted by the First, Fifth, 
and Sixth Circuits. See United States v. Braslawsky, 913 F.2d 466, 468 
(7th Cir. 1990); United States v. McMinn, 103 F.3d 216, 219-21 (1st Cir. 
1997); United States v. Warshawsky, 20 F.3d 204, 214-15 (6th Cir. 
1994); United States v. Esquivel, 919 F.2d 957, 960 (5th Cir. 1990). This 
test limits application of S 2B1.1(b)(4)(B) to a "professional fence and 
not 
a person who sells property that he has already stolen." Braslawsky, 
917 F.2d at 468. Although some Circuits have described the "totality of 
the circumstances" approach, upon which this Court relies, as a 
"competing test," see, e.g., United States v. Peysano, 104 F.3d 191, 192 
(8th Cir. 1997), nothing we said in King forecloses us from requiring in 
the future that a defendant be a "fence" for the enhancement to apply. 
Indeed, the First Circuit, which formulated the"totality of the 
circumstances" test, has recently indicated that proof that a defendant 
was in the business of receiving and selling stolen property is a 
prerequisite to the four level increase. See McMinn, 103 F.3d at 222. 
 
Moreover, we have no need to revisit the question here. Cottman does 
not contend that he was the "thief," and there is ample evidence that the 
majority of cable boxes, sold by Cottman, were actually pilfered by 
others. Cf. McMinn, 103 F.3d at 222 ("Nothing prevents a professional 
thief from also conducting a fencing operation of sufficient size and 
continuity to qualify for the ITB enhancement; criminals, too, may have 
more than one line of business.") (dictum). 
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States v. Salemi, 46 F.3d 207, 210-11 (2d Cir. 1995). But 
see United States v. Connor, 950 F.2d 1267, 1275 (7th Cir. 
1991) (suggesting that a defendant must have "engaged in 
sufficient illegal conduct which is similar to the instant 
offense"). 
 
The preponderance of the evidence here clearly 
establishes that Cottman filled a "fencing" role, and thereby 
created a market for those who would steal cable boxes by 
force or stealth. Indeed, Cottman even admitted that he 
took jobs in cable companies for the express purpose of 
encouraging people within those companies to steal cable 
boxes for him. PSI P 24. 
 
The Government also asserts that "lack of regularity can 
be made up for in a given case by a strong showing of 
sophistication." Although we do not address this point in 
King, the First Circuit's decision in St. Cyr, upon which 
King draws heavily, speaks to it: 
 
       We can easily imagine situations in which a fencing 
       business, although very much a business, has been 
       recently launched and therefore traces no historical 
       pattern. In order to distinguish a new-to-the-business 
       fence from an amateur, however, the government must 
       at least offer a meaningful proxy for regularity, say, by 
       showing that the operation crossed a threshold of 
       sophistication and commitment. 
 
St. Cyr, 977 F.2d at 704. This conclusion is consistent with 
King's holding that the government can sustain application 
of the enhancement, where sales are only "irregular or 
occasional," if the sales underrepresent the true "scope of 
the defendant's criminality or the extent to which he 
encouraged or facilitated other crimes." King, 21 F.3d at 
1308. 
 
There is abundant evidence that the operation in which 
Cottman took part was run with a large measure of 
professionalism. In the Government's recordings, Cottman 
extensively discusses the preparations he put into 
developing sources. After his arrest, Cottman admitted that 
he had taken jobs with cable companies in order to 
cultivate contacts who would acquire boxes for him. Those 
contacts were sophisticated enough to manipulate 
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computer systems at the cable companies to delete the 
stolen boxes from inventory. And, notwithstanding 
Cottman's ill-considered choice to ask the UCA to delete the 
serial numbers for him, Cottman demonstrated an 
awareness of measures which would help to elude 
detection. 
 
Finally, Cottman argues that the district court should 
have given greater weight to the fact that he has held down 
legitimate employment in the cable industry for many 
years. Asserting that he "clearly is not a millionaire," 
Cottman suggests that his lifestyle and employment is 
inconsistent with the criminal history attributed to him. 
However, the fact that a defendant continues to hold down 
a legitimate job does not foreclose an enhancement. See, 
e.g., St. Cyr, 977 F.2d at 703 ("In searching for evidence of 
regularity, we do not suggest that the selling of stolen 
property must be the dominant source of a defendant's 
income before his felonious activities become sufficiently 
prominent to be regarded as a business."). The district 
court's incredulity was warranted here since Cottman's 
legitimate line of business also neatly facilitated his ability 
to obtain illegal cable boxes. See PSI P 24. 
 
In sum, the district court did not err in imposing the 
U.S.S.G. S 2B1.1(b)(4)(B) enhancement. The evidence easily 
supports the characterization of Cottman's activities as 
regular and sophisticated. 
 
C. Restitution of the Government's "Buy Money" 
 
Cottman also disputes the district court's imposition, as 
a condition of supervised release, of an order requiring him 
to make restitution to the FBI for the money it paid him to 
acquire the illegal cable boxes. Cottman argues that "the 
Government voluntarily spent the money to buy the boxes," 
and therefore "was not the victim of the incident." 
 
In the district court, the Government sought restitution 
to the FBI as a condition of Cottman's supervised release. 
The Government proffered alternate rationales for this 
order. First, the Government argued that its request could 
be sustained under the Victim Witness Protection Act 
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(VWPA), 18 U.S.C. S 3663 to 3664 (1985 & supp. 1995).10 
Second, the Government asserted that the supervised 
release statute, 18 U.S.C. S 3583 (1985 & supp. 1995), 
provided an independent basis for an order of restitution. 
See Dep't of Justice Letter of July 10, 1996, Appendix at 
25-32. 
 
The district court declined to order restitution under the 
VWPA, finding that the FBI was not a "victim" of Cottman's 
offense within the meaning of the Act. Appendix at 44-46. 
However, the district court then proceeded to find that 
Cottman could be required to reimburse the Government's 
buy money under the supervised release statute. The 
district court ruled from the bench that, pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. S 3583(d), Cottman would be ordered to repay the 
FBI as a condition of his supervised release since this 
condition involved "no greater deprivation of liberty than is 
reasonably necessary for the purposes of affording adequate 
deterrence to criminal conduct." Appendix at 50. 
 
The district court chose not to award restitution under 
the VWPA because the prevailing view is that ordinarily the 
Government cannot be a "victim" under the VWPA when its 
losses were incurred as a result of its having provided the 
"buy" money used in a government sting which led to the 
defendant's arrest.11 See Appendix at 46 ("[T]he FBI, I find, 
is not a victim of defendant Cottman's offense and the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, enacted as Tit. II, 
Subtitle A, of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, Apr. 24, 1996, 110 Stat. 1227, 
substantially revised the restitution scheme. Its provisions are not, 
however, directly applicable to this case. AEDPA Subtitle B contains an 
effective date provision providing that "[t]he amendments made by this 
subtitle shall, to the extent constitutionally permissible, be effective 
for 
sentencing proceedings in cases in which the defendant is convicted on 
or after the date of enactment of this Act." AEDPA S 211. Cottman 
entered a plea of guilty on March 7, 1996, while AEDPA was not signed 
into law until April 24, 1996. 
 
11. See, e.g., United States v. Meacham, 27 F.3d 214, 218-19 (6th Cir. 
1994); United States v. Salcedo-Lopez, 907 F.2d 97, 98 (9th Cir. 1990); 
Gall v. United States, 21 F.3d 107, 111-12 (6th Cir. 1994); United States 
v. Daddato, 996 F.2d 903, 905 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Findley, 
783 F. Supp. 1123, 1127 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 
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$34,740 [sic] is not recoverable under the VWPA."); 
Appellee's Br. at 26 (conceding in respect to restitution 
orders requiring repayment of buy money as a condition of 
probation, "such disgorgement is arguably improper under 
the restitution statutes, given that they focus squarely on 
compensation to victims and not punishment"). 
 
We have not yet had to determine whether the VWPA 
allows restitution to the government for funds expended in 
a sting, such as we have here.12 However, the other circuits, 
which have considered the question, have held that 
investigative costs and voluntary expenditures by the 
government to procure evidence are not losses. See, e.g., 
United States v. Khawaja, 118 F.3d 1454, 1460 (11th Cir. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Although the government suggests otherwise, we have issued no 
decisions inconsistent with the view that costs of prosecution generally 
are not recoverable by the government. In the first case cited by the 
government, United States v. Hand, 863 F.2d 1100 (3d Cir. 1988), the 
appellant had pled guilty to one count of criminal contempt arising out 
of improper contact she had had, while a juror in a criminal case, with 
a defendant. Id. at 1101-02. As a result of her improper contact, the 
trial 
judge was forced to vacate the convictions of six defendants. Id. at 1102. 
The district court made it a condition of the appellant's probation that 
she make restitution to the government for the costs of reprosecuting the 
five defendants whose convictions had been voided. Id. We concluded 
that the United States Attorneys' Office was a victim directly affected by 
the appellant's criminal conduct since resources expended in obtaining 
the original convictions were wasted. Id. at 1103-05. 
 
In the second case, United States v. Kress, 944 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 
1991), the appellant had been convicted for his role in a scheme to 
defraud the United States Department of Defense on several contracts to 
provide the military with educational and employment training 
programs. Id. at 157 & n.1. The appellant, as a condition of probation, 
was ordered to repay the government $300,000 overfive years with 
interest at a rate of 18% per annum. Id. at 157. We concluded that 
"defendants may be required under the VWPA to pay restitution to 
federal governmental bodies as a special condition of probation." Id. 
(citing Hand). Further, we held that the interest was properly imposed 
since it facilitated the Act's goal of fully compensating the victim, here 
the government. Id. at 159-60. 
 
Both of these cases are, however, distinguishable since in each the 
government was an unwilling participant in the defendant's criminal 
activity and suffered direct and substantial losses therefrom. 
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1997); United States v. Gibbens, 25 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 
1994); United States v. Meacham, 27 F.3d 214, 218 (6th 
Cir. 1994); United States v. Salcedo-Lopez, 907 F.2d 97, 98 
(9th Cir. 1990). We will follow this well considered 
construction of the VWPA and hold that, when the 
government chooses to apprehend offenders through a sting 
operation, the government is not a "victim" under the 
provisions of the VWPA. 
 
However, the district court awarded restitution, not 
under the VWPA, but under the "any other condition it 
considers appropriate" language of 18 U.S.C. S 3583(d).13 
Section 3583(d) of the supervised release statute authorizes 
the imposition of certain of the discretionary conditions of 
probation, set forth in 18 U.S.C. S 3563(b) (1985 & supp. 
1995). When Cottman was sentenced, S 3563(b)(3) 
permitted the district court to order a defendant as a 
condition of probation to "make restitution to a victim of 
the offense under sections 3663 and 3664 . . .." 
 
The District Court employed the term "restitution" when 
imposing repayment at the sentencing hearing. Appendix at 
59. The amount of the repayment is also entered under 
"Restitution" on the Judgment form. Appendix at 16. 
Because this condition of supervised release was ordered 
pursuant to S 3563(b), we deduce from the use of this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Section 3583(d) grants the sentencing judge discretion to: 
 
       order, as a further condition of supervised release, to the extent 
that 
       such condition-- 
 
       (1) is reasonably related to the factors set forth in section 
       3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D); 
 
       (2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably 
       necessary for the purposes set forth in section 3552(a)(2)(B), 
       (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D); and 
 
       (3) is consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by 
       the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 994(a); 
 
       any condition set forth as a discretionary condition of probation 
in 
       section 3563(b)(1) through (b)(10) and (b)(12) through (b)(20), and 
       any other condition it considers to be appropriate. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 3583(d). 
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language that the order of restitution followed the 
provisions of that section and that it incorporated by 
reference S 3563(b)'s terminology "restitution to the victim" 
(emphasis added). Thus, we again are faced with the 
requirement that restitution be made to a "victim." We 
cannot see how the FBI can be a "victim" under S 3563(b) 
if it is not a "victim" under the VWPA. We feel obliged to 
conclude that the statutory provisions are parallel in their 
definition of "victim." See Gall v. United States, 21 F.3d 
107, 111 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that "S 3583(d) via its 
reference to . . . S 3563(b)(3) requires restitution to conform 
with provisions of the VWPA").14 
 
On remand, it may be that other victims of Cottman's 
offense can be ascertained. However, for the reasons stated 
above, we hold that the FBI was not a victim and, as a 
result, the conditions of Cottman's supervised release 
cannot include a requirement that he pay restitution to the 
FBI.15 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
In view of the aforesaid, Cottman's judgment of sentence 
will be affirmed insofar as it imposed a term of 
imprisonment with an enhancement under S 2B1.1(b)(4)(B). 
We will, however, vacate the conditions of supervised 
release portion of the judgment of sentence, imposing the 
condition of payment of restitution to the FBI. We will 
remand this case to the district court for resentencing. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. The dissent voices the concern that "a person who knowingly sells 
stolen merchandise should not be permitted to profit from the sale. . . . 
The taxpayer . . . should not have to bear the cost of `buy money.' The 
. . . money involved has gone into the defendant's pocket and to the 
extent practicable should be recovered." Dissent at 24-25. We are not 
unsympathetic with this point of view. We note, however, that in future 
cases the district court may consider imposing afine which is equivalent 
to the amount of any buy money a defendant has received from the 
Government. See U.S.S.G. S 5E1.2. 
 
15. Because the district court may choose to consider other conditions of 
supervised release, we remand rather than reverse. We note, however, 
that at sentencing the district judge noted that Cottman did not have the 
ability to pay a fine. Appendix at 59. 
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LUDWIG, District Judge, Concurring and Dissenting: 
 
I join in the majority's decision on lack of mootness and 
affirmance of the application of the four level "in the 
business" Guidelines enhancement. U.S.S.G. S 2B1.1. I 
respectfully dissent from its decision to vacate the condition 
of supervised release requiring repayment to the 
government of $32,420 in "buy money" provided to 
defendant by the FBI. Defendant received those monies, in 
various installments, from an undercover agent in exchange 
for 231 stolen TV boxes - the subject matter of the 
conspiracy charge to which defendant pleaded guilty. The 
crime occurred in 1995, and the defendant was sentenced 
on July 22, 1996. 
 
The majority holds that restitution of "buy money" is not 
an authorized condition of supervised release under the 
Victim Witness Protection Act of 1982, 18 U.S.C.SS 3663- 
3664 (1985 & supp. 1995) or the supervised release 
statute, 18 U.S.C. S 3583 (1985 & supp. 1995). Its 
reasoning is that the expenditure of "buy money" is a cost 
of law enforcement and does not qualify the government as 
a "victim" - the traditional prerequisite of restitution. I 
agree with that analysis as relates to the VWPA. 1 However, 
I do not believe it is necessary to decide that issue in 
applying the supervised release statute to this case. First, 
the sentencing judge did not intend to order "restitution" in 
the victim-related sense of the word - which is the 
underlying premise of the majority's conclusion. Second, I 
would hold that the repayment of "buy money" is 
authorized as a discretionary condition of supervised 
release under 18 U.S.C. S 3583(d)(3). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. 18 U.S.C. SS 3663-3664. See United States v. Gibbens, 25 F.3d 28, 32 
(1st Cir. 1994) ("[T]he government is not a`victim' for purposes of the 
VWPA [and may not be awarded restitution] to the extent that it incurs 
costs in the clandestine provocation of a crime that, if carried to 
fruition 
under ordinary circumstances, would not directly harm the 
government."); accord United States v. Meacham, 27 F.3d 214, 218 (6th 
Cir. 1994); United States v. Salcedo-Lopez, 907 F.2d 97, 98 (9th Cir. 
1990). 
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I 
 
The sentencing judge stated, after discussing the victim- 
restitution cases: 
 
       [T]he FBI, I find, is not a victim of defendant Cottman's 
       offense and the "buy money" is not recoverable under 
       the VWPA. Therefore, I agree with defendant's objection 
       to the award of restitution to the FBI. Restitution 
       should be made to the owners of the cable boxes .... 
       I'm ordering that the boxes be returned to their rightful 
       owners as restitution. 
 
Appendix at 46-47. The sentencing judge then reviewed the 
"buy-money" decision in United States v. Daddato, 996 F.2d 
903 (7th Cir. 1993) and concluded that authority for a 
repayment order was conferred by the supervised release 
statute provision: "any other condition [the court] considers 
to be appropriate." 18 U.S.C. S 3583(d)(3). 
 
The sentencing judge - as the majority stresses - referred 
at times to the repayment as "restitution" and the 
repayment is so characterized on the judgment of sentence 
form. Nevertheless, the judge's sentencing statement 
unmistakably shows the intent to follow Daddato and to 
exercise "any other condition" discretion, not to order 
restitution to the FBI as a victim. Appendix at 47-50, 59. 
The significance of the distinction is more than semantic. 
By incorporating by reference the conditions authorized in 
the probation statute, the supervised release statute also 
empowers the sentencing judge to order "restitution to the 
victim." 18 U.S.C. S 3563(b)(3). Under the VWPA cases, that 
provision, by its own terminology, could not be utilized to 
order a repayment of "buy money." Despite the finding of 
the sentencing judge that the FBI was not a "victim" and 
was not entitled to victim-related "restitution," the majority 
conclusively infers that the condition was imposed under 
S 3563(b)(3) and was, accordingly, invalid. 
 
Moreover, the idea of restitution, which historically has 
involved redress to a victim, has been evolving to include 
victimless reparations.2 The sentencing judge's sporadic use 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The VWPA amendment of 1996, 18 U.S.C. S 3663(c)(1), includes 
restitution of "community harm" in drug cases where there is no 
"identifiable victim." 
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of "restitution" in a non-victim-related sense to refer to the 
repayment of "buy money" has good precedent. In Daddato, 
now Chief Judge Posner's decision characterizes the 
repayment of "buy money" as "in the nature of restitution," 
observing that "[we] need not determine whether such an 
order is also classic `restitution'...." 996 F.2d at 903, 905. 
See United States v. Brooks, 114 F.3d 106, 108 (7th Cir. 
1997) ("In Daddato, after noting that an order to repay buy 
money as "restitution" under the[VWPA] was not cricket, 
we found that such an order would nevertheless pass 
muster as a condition of supervised release" (bold in 
original)). The majority's predicate that the sentencing judge 
must have intended to act under 18 U.S.C. S 3563(b) simply 
is not well founded. The sentencing judge was well aware of 
both the traditional compensatory and the victimless, or 
nontraditional, meaning of "restitution" - and clearly did 
not believe he was invoking S 3563(b).3 
 
II 
 
Daddato dealt with precisely the same question as is 
presented here: 
 
       Pursuant to his plea of guilty, James Daddato was 
       convicted of ... selling hallucinogenic mushrooms and 
       sentenced to 16 months in prison to be followed by 
       three years of supervised release. His appeal challenges 
       one of the conditions of supervised release: that he 
       repay the $3,650 that he received from law 
       enforcement officers in payment for mushrooms that 
       they bought from him in order to obtain conclusive 
       evidence of his guilt. The statute governing supervised 
       release empowers the sentencing judge to impose as a 
       condition of such release any condition authorized as 
       discretionary condition of probation plus "any other 
       condition it considers to be appropriate." 18 U.S.C. 
       S 3583(d). Obviously the language is broad enough to 
       encompass the requirement that the defendant make 
       good the government's "buy money"; nor could the 
       imposition of such a requirement be thought an abuse 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The sentencing judge read a substantial excerpt of Daddato into the 
record. 
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       of discretion - it merely asks the defendant (if he is 
       financially able, once his release from prison enable 
       him to obtain a paying job) to make good the expense 
       to which he put the government by violating the laws 
       that prohibit drug trafficking in a selected subset of 
       mind-altering drugs. 
 
996 F.2d at 903. 
 
The opinion then rejects the argument that repayment of 
"buy money" is beyond the sentencing judge's power 
because "any other condition" must be comparable, by 
virtue of "ejusdem generis," to the 20 specific conditions 
that precede it. Daddato explains that the return of "buy 
money" is comparable to, albeit not the same as, traditional 
"restitution." 
 
       An order to repay the government's "buy money" is 
       similar in requiring the defendant to convey something 
       of value to the community, rather than to his victims 
       (if any there be) specifically. State v. Connelly, 143 Wis. 
       2d 500, 421 N.W.2d 859 (App. 1988) 
 
       * * * * 
 
       On the one hand, it seems unrealistic to describe the 
       defendant as having wrongfully taken money eagerly 
       tendered to him so that he could incriminate himself. 
       On the other hand, it was money that he obtained 
       through criminal activity and therefore had no right to 
       keep. No matter. The list in section 3563(b) is not 
       limited to restitution, or even to conditions that 
       resemble restitution (which this, at the very least, 
       does); it is enough that the order to repay the buy 
       money is of the same general kind as the items in the 
       list, and it is. 
 
996 F.2d at 905 (bold in original). 
 
The year after Daddato, a panel of the Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals granted S 2255 relief where a supervised release 
condition to repay "buy money" was imposed as to four 
drug charges, although three of the charges had been 
dismissed in exchange for the defendant's guilty plea to the 
fourth. Gall v. United States, 21 F.3d 107 (6th Cir. 1994). 
The decision, after confining "restitution" as a condition of 
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supervised release to crimes "charged and convicted," 
described the second part of its holding: "the government is 
not a victim to which a district court may order a defendant 
to pay restitution for the purpose of recovering drug `buy 
money' and other costs of investigation voluntarily paid 
out." 21 F.3d at 108 (bold in original). In much the same 
way as our majority, which cites Gall for this point, it 
ignores Daddato and equates repayment of "buy money" 
with traditional "restitution"; it then summarily conflates 
S 3563(b)(3) with the VWPA because of the incorporation by 
reference of S 3563(b)(3) - "restitution to the victim." 
 
The concurrence in Gall, however, focuses on Daddato 
and criticizes it for having resorted to the "any other 
condition" provision of S 3583(d). Interestingly, the rationale 
is not that the restoration of "buy money" must be 
classified or construed to be the same as victim-related 
restitution. 
 
       Under S 3583(d)(2) ... a sentencing judge can only order 
       additional "appropriate" conditions of supervised 
       release that "involve no greater deprivation of liberty 
       than is reasonably necessary for the purposes of: (1) 
       affording adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (2) 
       protecting the public from further crimes of the 
       defendant; and (3) providing the defendant with ... 
       training ... care ... or treatment.... 
 
       * * * * 
 
       Ordering a criminal defendant, as a condition of 
       supervised release, to repay the government's buy 
       money or other investigative costs deprives the 
       defendant of liberty during the period of supervised 
       release, yet does not advance any of these three 
       purposes.... Indeed, such a deprivation of liberty ... 
       could actually encourage the defendant to commit 
       further crimes as a means of repaying such an onerous 
       financial burden. 
 
21 F.3d at 112-113. 
 
In the instant sentencing, the judge quoted the above- 
portion of the concurrence and stated: 
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       I disagree with Judge Jones' reasoning. This is because 
       I find that ordering the defendant, pursuant to 
       S 3583(d) to repay the FBI as a condition of his 
       supervised release, even though restitution of this 
       money to the FBI is not authorized under the VWPA, 
       involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is 
       reasonably necessary for the purposes of affording 
       adequate deterrence to criminal conduct. 
 
Appendix at 50. 
 
In my view, the sentencing judge correctly overruled 
defendant's "buy money" objection that was based on the 
Gall concurrence. The repayment of "buy money" imposes 
no greater deprivation of liberty and is no less a deterrent 
of criminal conduct than traditional restitution and other 
specifically authorized conditions of supervised release. 
 
III 
 
The broader question presented by this case is the nature 
and extent of the sentencing options that are statutorily 
authorized to achieve the objectives of sentencing. Under 18 
U.S.C. S 3553, the sentencing judge is directed to consider, 
in part - 
 
       (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and 
       characteristics of the defendant; 
 
       (2) the need for the sentence imposed - 
 
       (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to 
       promote respect for the law, and to provide just 
       punishment for the offense; 
 
Given these purposes, it would seem to be beyond 
dispute that a person who knowingly sells stolen 
merchandise should not be permitted to profit from the 
sale. The provision of the supervised release statute that 
authorizes "any other condition [the court] considers to be 
appropriate," is in addition to - and not synonymous with 
or subordinate to - the condition authorizing victim-related 
restitution. The costs of law enforcement are paid from 
taxes, and criminal defendants are not required to 
reimburse the government for their day in court. The 
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taxpayer, however, should not have to bear the cost of "buy 
money." The difference is that the money involved has gone 
into the defendant's pocket and to the extent practicable 
should be recovered. This is a self-evident corollary of 
"respect for the law" and "just punishment." 
 
The majority's decision today puts an incongruous and 
unnecessary limitation on the power of the sentencing 
judge to effectuate the legislatively mandated goals of 
sentencing. 
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